Abstract. In this paper, we tackle a complex real-world problem: trainee allocation for primary school teachers in a French teaching Academy. This complex real-world problem can be reduced into the wellknown Hospitals / Residents (HR) problem. However, the most difficult part consists of generating the preference lists according to the real constraints, priorities and wishes. Additionally, we adapt the Swing method to the HR problem and we apply it to this real-world problem in order to balance the different objectives. In this way, the Swing method decreases the management cost of the operation.
Introduction
Many real-world problems can be understood as matchmaking problems in which two sets need to be paired up: the assignment of junior physicians to hospitals [1] , staff to faculties [2] , students to colleges [3] , children to schools [1, 4] , online matrimony [5] , etc. Whatever the application domains are, the problem consists in finding the best matching between individuals. This problem was first studied in [6] which provides a constructive proof showing that every instance admits at least one admissible solution.
In this paper, we tackle a complex real-world problem: trainee allocation for primary school teachers in a French teaching Academy (in French, IUFM). For this purpose, the University Institute for Teachers Training has a program to allocate training practices according to the desiderata of trainees and the constraints of the supervisors. In order to be assigned, each teacher selects and orders two areas where she wants to be assigned. Additionally, priority is given to trainees having more children, then those working part-time and finally those with no car. Conversely, the diplomas of supervisors and the distances between the trainees and the supervisors allows to prioritize them. In order to manage the increasing number of recruitments, the allocation, which is performed manually, must be automated. It is worth noticing no optimization method can be applied due to scalability issues. This complex real-world problem can be reduced into the well-known Hospitals / Residents (HR) problem [6] . However, the most difficult part consists of generating the preference lists according to the real constraints, priorities and wishes. Additionally, when we apply the existing algorithm for solving this problem we promote one community (e.g. the average distance) or another (e.g. the priority over trainees). Actually, even if the solution given by the Gale-Shapley algorithm is stable, it is the best one for one community but the worst for the other community [7] . By contrast, a recent method aims at reaching "fair" outcome: Swing [8] . In this paper, we adapt the Swing method to the HR problem and we apply it to a complex real-world problem in order to balance the different objectives. Since some constraints are relaxed, the Swing method decreases the management cost of the operation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the background of our work. We adapt the Swing method in order to tackle this problem. Then, we present the real-world problem we address and we compare the solutions computed by the modified Swing method with some classical algorithms. Finally, section 5 discusses some related works and section 6 concludes.
Background
The Hospitals / Residents (HR) problem was first defined in [6] . This problem is a many-one generalization of the well-known Stable Marriage Problem.
In the HR problem, each man corresponds to a resident and each woman corresponds to a hospital which can potentially be assigned to multiple residents up to some fixed capacity.
Definition 1 (HR).
An instance of Hospitals / Residents problem of size (n, m), with n ≥ 1 and m ≥ 1, is a couple HR = H, R with |H| = n and |R| = m defined such that: A solution for an instance of HR is an assignment of residents in posts for each of the hospitals. The assignment of a resident is an hospital, possibly none (denoted θ). The posts of an hospital are residents, possibly the empty set. Obviously, the assignment is mutual. Considering the assignment M , if a M (r k ) = θ, r k is said to be unassigned, otherwise r k is assigned. Similarly, a hospital h k ∈ H is undersubscribed, full or oversubscribed if the corresponding number of residents in posts (denoted |p M (h k )|) is less than, equal to, or greater than c k , respectively. In a matching, no resident is assigned to an unacceptable hospital,
